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Abstract 
We examine Norwegian gasoline pump prices using daily station-specific 
observations from 2003 to 2006. The big four gasoline companies use an industry-
wide adopted vertical restraint (labeled price support) to move price control from the 
hands of independent retailers into the hands of the headquarters of the big four 
companies. Retail gasoline prices follow a fixed weekly pattern, where retail outlets 
all over Norway simultaneously (without knowing their rivals’ prices) increase their 
prices to the same level every Monday around noon. The price level on Mondays 
corresponds to the recommended prices published by the gasoline companies’ 
headquarters.  
                                                 
 Irina Karamushko, Asgeir Thue, Irene Kvernenes, Åse Tiller Vangsnes and Elisabeth Flasnes partly 
undertook the data collection as part of their master theses, and we are grateful for their assistance. We 
are also grateful for access to the DinSide data collection. The authors also gratefully acknowledge the 
helpful comments and suggestions of Kjetil Andersson, Stephen Davies, Gorm Grønnevet, Joseph E. 
Harrington, Erling Hjelmeng, Hans Jarle Kind, Lars Sørgard, Otto Toivanen and seminar participants at 
the Directorate-General for Competition Chief Economists 2008, the Centre for Competition Policy at 
the University of East Anglia 2007, The NIE, Summer Conference, Loughborough 2008. The CRESSE 
conference Athens 2008, EARIE 2008, Toulouse, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 2008, Copenhagen 
Business School 2008, Kiel University 2009, the Norwegian School of Management 2007 and the 
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration 2008. The title of an early version of the 
present paper was “Gasoline prices jump on Mondays: An outcome of aggressive competition?”. 
SNF Working Paper No 07/2011
  
1
1. Introduction 
All over Norway we observe gasoline price cycles that last exactly one week. Every 
Monday around noon, almost all retail outlets throughout Norway increase their retail 
prices to the same level. For the majority of retail outlets prices then gradually decline 
over the week, and are at their lowest level during the weekend and Monday morning.   
We show how the big four gasoline companies use a vertical restraint (labeled price 
support) to move price control from the hands of independent retailers into the hands 
of the headquarters of the big four companies. The way the price support system is 
used to ensure intrabrand synchronization of pump prices when the price cycles are 
restarted, resembles findings from Australia (Wang, 2009). We show that since 2004 
the headquarters have managed to establish an industry-wide pattern where all retail 
outlets raise their pump prices according to the recommended prices set by the 
headquarters around noon every Monday.  The price support system is thus a device 
that ensures intrabrand price coordination on Mondays. In contrast to the findings 
from Australia, we find that the headquarters simultaneously (without knowing rivals’ 
pump prices) increase their prices on Mondays. In the rest of the week, gasoline pump 
prices are set sequentially, and we show that the degree of vertical price control 
imposed by the headquarters towards the retail outlets varies from a pure Resale Price 
Maintenance (RPM) to a price floor.  
Price cycles, where sharp price increases are followed by a gradual reduction of retail 
prices, are found in markets in the United States (Castanias and Johnson, 1993, Doyle 
et.al. 2010, Lewis, 2011), Canada (Atkinson, 2009, Eckert, 2002, 2003, Eckert and 
West, 2004, and Noel, 2007a, 2007b) and Australia (ACCC, 2007 and Wang, 2008, 
2009), among others. In contrast to our findings, the price cycles observed in other 
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markets are typically longer than a week, and do not have a fixed duration like the 
Norwegian price cycles. Weekly price cycles have recently been observed in 
Australia, where Thursday is the high-price day (ACCC, 2007). As mentioned above a 
price support system is also present in Australia, but to our knowledge, we do not 
observe an industry-wide jump in prices to the same level as described in the present 
paper.  
The majority of these studies find empirical support for the notion that these price 
cycles are the outcome of competition à la Maskin and Tirole’s (1988) Edgeworth 
cycle theory.1 In Maskin and Tirole (1988) firms successively undercut each other in a 
price war phase, until further undercutting becomes too costly. We then have a war of 
attrition phase until one firm takes the burden and raises its prices. Other firms will 
then immediately follow suit and increase their prices, but not to the same level as the 
firm that initiated the price increase. The next cycle will then begin.2  A critical 
assumption is that firms set prices sequentially in both the increasing phase and the 
decreasing phase.  
When firms are in the war of attrition phase, Maskin and Tirole assume that firms 
play a mixed strategy game in order to decide whether they should be the first to 
increase the price or not. As emphasized by Wang (2009), firms have incentives to 
end the war of attrition game as soon as possible, and a firm may take the role as the 
price leader (see also Lewis, 2011). A main contribution of the present paper is to 
show how the headquarters of gasoline companies in Norway have managed to 
                                                 
1 Labeled Edgeworth cycles owing to Edgeworth (1925). 
2 Eckert (2003) and Noel (2007b, 2008) show that Edgeworth cycles in equilibrium are not restricted to 
a symmetric duopoly with homogenous goods, as assumed by Maskin and Tirole (1988). These 
extensions (which e.g. allow for size asymmetries) still predict that firms move sequentially. 
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establish an arrangement whereby they simultaneously decide to increase pump prices 
to a given level (the recommended price).  
The empirical studies closest in spirit to the current paper are Eckert and West (2004) 
and Noel (2007a), both of which use daily retail prices from the Canadian market. The 
main distinction between our observations and those of Eckert and West (2004) and 
Noel (2007a) relates to the process bywhich prices increase sharply.   
Wang (2008) shows how phone activity by the market leader resets Edgeworth cycles 
in the Australian retail gasoline cartel. More recently, Clark and Houde (2011) 
analyze how retailers in Quebec used phone conversations to initiate price increases 
after periods of repeated price reductions. Other empirical studies have considered 
weekly retail gasoline prices. Wang (2009) analyzes gasoline pricing before and under 
a law that regulates both the timing and frequency of retail price changes in Australia. 
Eckert (2003) and Noel (2007b) analyze weekly prices in the Canadian retail gasoline 
market, and find cycles consistent with Edgeworth cycle theory. Importantly, the type 
of fluctuations on which we focus in the present analysis cannot be discovered using 
weekly data.3 Noel (2009) analyzes how asymmetric cost pass-through in gasoline 
prices can be partly due to Edgeworth cycles using twice-daily price data from 
Canada. Analogous to Wang (2009) we draw attention to how the headquarters use 
vertical price control arrangements to restart the price cycles.  
                                                 
3 Castanias and Johnson (1993) provide statistics for Los Angeles from 1968 to 1972 that appear as 
Edgeworth cycles. Moreover, several studies analyze different forms of asymmetric pricing, i.e., a 
faster reaction in retail prices to upward changes than to downward changes in wholesale prices 
(Bacon, 1991, Borenstein et al., 1997, Asplund et al., (2000), Bachmeier and Griffin, 2003, Eckert, 
2002, Bettendorf et al., 2003 and Bettendorf et al., 2008). Slade (1987, 1992) analyzes separate price 
wars in the Vancouver area during the summer of 1983, finding that shifts in demand trigger price 
wars. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data sets used, 
and section 3 presents details of the price cycle pattern in Norway. In Section 4, we 
describe how retail prices are determined. In section 5 we discuss potential alternative 
explanations for the pattern observed. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Data description   
We collected two data sets with daily station-specific observations of gasoline pump 
prices: 
 The first is from a national website-based (NWB) panel data set. This is from a 
large number of nationwide Norwegian stations over the period March 2003 to 
April 2005, where consumers reported prices via text messages or emails. The 
original data set comprised approximately 40,000 observations. We reduced 
the sample to 26,823 observations by excluding gas stations with less than 100 
observations, leaving us with 116 stations across Norway.  
 The second data set comprises time series (LTS) of daily prices from local 
stations for two periods of four to five months during 2005 and 2006. This 
yielded 1,067 observations from seven stations, with consecutive daily time 
series of pump prices varying between 50 and 312 days. 
The NWB and LTS data sets are complementary in the sense that, whereas the web-
based data (NWB) allows us to examine a wider set of stations over a longer time-
period, the local data (LTS) on specific gasoline stations allows for a more precise 
analysis of price patterns. In the LTS data we have consecutive observations for 
relatively long periods that we can compare with recommended prices. The data sets 
are described in more detail in Appendix A. 
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When we started to collect the LTS-prices, we were not aware of the role of the 
recommended prices. These prices were collected between 4 pm and 7 pm. In order to 
demonstrate more accurately the industry-wide raise in prices towards the 
recommended prices, we collected the following data set: 
 Pump prices at 8 am and 2 pm for three consecutive Mondays in April 2008 
for all gasoline stations in Oslo. We label this the OSLO data set. 
As a complement to our analysis of the price data, we undertook the following survey: 
 In 2008 and 2009 we interviewed 35 gasoline station managers in order to gain 
more information about the price support system and how price control shifts 
from the hands of the retailers to the headquarters, and how this system is used 
to ensure interbrand uniform pump prices on Mondays around noon. 
3. Price cycles  
3.1. Descriptive analysis 
The Norwegian market is dominated by the big four gasoline companies; Statoil (the 
partially state owned oil company), Shell, Esso (Exxon), and Hydro-Texaco (now 
YX). In 2004 their market shares were 26.9%, 25.5%, 21.7%, 20.8%, respectively. 
The remaining 5.1% of the market consisted of independent automated stations.4  The 
European Commission (2008) emphasizes that the Norwegian retail gasoline market 
is highly concentrated, and states that (page 36): Fuel retail margins are very high in 
Norway, amongst the highest in Europe. Norwegian gross distribution margins were, 
                                                 
4 Source: The Norwegian Petroleum Industry Association. 
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expressed as a percentage of Community average, 128.9% for petrol and 155.8% for 
diesel in 2006.  
The average daily prices over all seven local gasoline stations are illustrated in Figure 
1. The price is clearly at its highest on Monday before gradually returning to its 
lowest level over the week. Looking only at averages might be misleading. To fully 
uncover the underlying dynamics in price changes across stations we have therefore 
tabulated all price changes for all stations and weeks for the LTS data in Table 1.  
Figure 1 Weekly price and cost patterns based on the local time series (LTS) (n = 
1,067 (price), n = 1,062 (Rotterdam price + gasoline tax), same pattern illustrated for 
four weeks) 
10
10.1
10.2
10.3
10.4
10.5
10.6
10.7
10.8
10.9
11
Mo
nd
ay
Tu
es
da
y
We
dn
es
da
y
Th
urs
da
y
Fri
da
y
Sa
tur
da
y
Su
nd
ay
Mo
nd
ay
Tu
es
da
y
We
dn
es
da
y
Th
urs
da
y
Fri
da
y
Sa
tur
da
y
Su
nd
ay
Mo
nd
ay
Tu
es
da
y
We
dn
es
da
y
Th
urs
da
y
Fri
da
y
Sa
tur
da
y
Su
nd
ay
Mo
nd
ay
Tu
es
da
y
We
dn
es
da
y
Th
urs
da
y
Fri
da
y
Sa
tur
da
y
Su
nd
ay
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
7.8
7.9
8
8.1
Price Rotterdam+Tax
 
There are potentially 149 Monday observations where the price can change, and as 
many as 117 (79%) are price increases, with the average price increase being quite 
high, NOK 0.68 (1 € ≈ NOK 8). If we consider the remaining days when prices could 
change (907 days), we only observe 67 days where prices increase (7%). Turning to 
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days with price reductions, we find that on only five occasions are price reductions 
observed on Mondays, while there are as many as 384 price reductions on other days 
of the week, (42% of the 907 observed days). Note also that the reductions are spread 
quite evenly over the rest of the week with between 65 and 86 reductions each day. 
Table 1 Daily price changes across seven gasoline stations for the period January 4, 
2005 to March 15, 2006 (n = 1,056) 
 Observations Price increases Price reductions No Price change 
  n mean n Mean n 
 
Monday 149 117 0.677 5 –0.108 27 
  (78.5%)  (3.4%)  (18.1%) 
Tuesday 153 8 0.575 80 –0.266 65 
  (5.2%)  (52.3%)  (42.5%) 
Wednesday 152 7 0.579 86 –0.314 59 
  (4.6%)  (56.6%)  (38.8%) 
Thursday 149 31 0.436 65 –0.274 53 
  (20.8%)  (43.6%)  (35.6%) 
Friday 149 14 0.594 79 –0.285 56 
  (9.4%)  (53.0%)  (37.6%) 
Saturday 152 5 0.224 52 –0.264 95 
  (3.3%)  (34.2%)  (62.5%) 
Sunday 152 2 0.690 22 –0.163 128 
  (1.3%)  (14.5%)  (84.2%) 
       
Total 1056 184  389  483 
  (17.4%)  (36.8%)  (45.7%) 
 
We now turn to the NWB data, where we find an identical pattern. In order to make 
the picture clearer, we construct alternative days in the sense that each day starts at 
noon, e.g., Monday starts at noon on Monday and lasts until noon on Tuesday but is 
still denoted ‘Monday’ in figures and tables. However, in this dataset the price pattern 
changes after Easter 2004 (after 27.04.2004) from being highest on Thursdays to 
being highest on Mondays.  
In fact, from April 27th 2004 Monday changed from being the low-price day to 
becoming the high-price day. To better observe this, we calculated price differences 
between Monday and Thursday for the NWB data over the period March 2003 to 
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April 2005, and present these in Figure 2. The figure shows a clear pattern whereby 
the Thursday price is predominantly higher than the Monday price up until Easter 
2004. After Easter 2004, the price is higher on Mondays. Figure 2 also suggests a 
return to the previous Thursday pattern over six weeks during the fall of 2004 
(06.09.04-17.10.04). We have not been able to find an explanation for this return to 
the previous pattern.   
Figure 2 Price differences between Monday and Thursday (Thursday price minus 
Monday price) for the period March 2003 to April 2005 based on the web-based panel 
data (NWB) where days are defined as noon to noon, (n = 26,823, area marked is 
April 2004) 
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In Figure 3 we illustrate the weekly cycles for the period before and after April 2004. 
After Easter, we observe the same pattern as in the LTS data, whereas up until Easter 
2004, Thursday was the high-price day. The ‘After April 2004’ pattern shows a small 
‘bump’ also on Thursdays. This is primarily due to the return of the old pattern during 
the six weeks in the fall of 2004. When we disregard these six weeks, the small 
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Thursday ‘bump’ disappears, and the Monday effect is even more visible. We also 
know from the interviews with the station managers that prices are sometimes raised 
in the same way on Thursdays as on Mondays.  
Figure 3 Weekly price pattern based on web-based panel data (NWB) where days are 
defined from noon to noon, showing the series of daily prices, and averages per day 
per year (n = 26,823, same pattern illustrated for four weeks) 
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Another distinctive feature of the observed price cycles is the fact that retail prices 
throughout Norway are raised to the recommended prices set by the headquarters of 
the gasoline companies (how retail prices are determined is discussed in the next 
section). In Figure 4, we show the development of actual retail and recommended 
prices for one of the Statoil stations in the LTS data set. Every Monday, the 
recommended price and the actual retail price coincide. Due to transportation costs, 
the individual rule for this station is to set the pump price NOK 0.02 above the 
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recommended price (≈0.25 €-cent).5 From Figure 4 we see that the pump price is 
increased on 17 out of 18 Mondays. For 16 Mondays the pattern follows the 
individual rule – NOK 0.02 above the recommended price.6 We also observe six price 
increases on Thursdays, five of which follow the individual rule.  
Figure 4: Daily gasoline prices, Statoil gasoline station, NHH, Bergen, January 2005 
to May 2005, (LTS data, n = 120) 
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In order to better explain the industry-wide raise in prices on Mondays, and the 
relationship between pump prices and recommended prices, we now turn to the OSLO 
data set. We asked all gasoline stations in Oslo about their pump prices at 8 am and 2 
pm for three consecutive Mondays in April 2008. Figure 5 shows the observed prices 
                                                 
5 The big four companies use a detailed system where each station is given a transportation cost that 
depends on location. This system is briefly described on www.statoil.no and is confirmed in our 
interviews with station managers and also by The Norwegian Competition Authority (2010). 
6 The only Monday where we do not observe a price increase is 28 March, which was a holiday. In this 
case, the price instead increased according to the rule on the following Tuesday. Monday 16th May we 
observe an increase, though not strictly according to the rule - this may be due to the fact that the next 
day was a holiday. 
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on (i) Monday April 7, (ii) Monday April 15, and (iii) Monday April 21, 2008. We 
observe that at 8 am there exists a significant degree of price dispersion, but at 2 pm 
almost all stations have raised their price according to the recommended prices.  If we 
concentrate on Statoil, we have in total 49 observed prices at 8 am and 47 observed 
prices at 2 pm. At 2 pm, for 42 of the 47 observations, the pump prices were set 
exactly NOK 0.06 above the recommended price.   
Figure 5 Retail and recommended prices at 8 am and 2 pm for all gasoline stations in 
Oslo (i) Monday April 7, (ii) Monday April 15, and (iii) Monday April 21, 
2008.
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We do not have volume data, but the Norwegian Competition Authority (NCA, 2010) 
has recently presented data on how demand varies over the week.7 In Figure 6 we 
show a facsimile from the Norwegian Competition Authority (2010).  
Figure 6 Volume in % of weekly consumption over the week in 2005 and 2008, 
respectively. Source: The Norwegian Competition Authority (2010). 
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Two important observations can be made: First, as the new pattern with low prices 
Sunday and Monday morning has become known to more and more customers, 
volumes in the periods 09:36-19:12 on Sundays and 04:48-09:36 on Mondays have 
increased by around 50% from approximately 3% to 4-5% of weekly consumption 
from 2005 to 2008. Second, while volume is reduced in off-peak periods during the 
                                                 
7 The NCA has collected all prices, price changes and corresponding volumes for the total Norwegian 
market from the oil companies. The data allows them to aggregate the prices and price changes into 
different time intervals. They have chosen to divide the 24 hour period into five intervals, each of 4 
hours and 48 minutes; 00:00-04:48, 04:48-09:36, 09:36-14:24, 14:24-19:12 and 19:12-24:00, providing 
35 intervals per week. The NCA (2010) report confirms the price pattern we find in our data. 
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weekdays, volume is not reduced in peak-periods during weekdays. This suggests that 
it is not as easy for the utility drivers to change their consumption pattern during 
weekdays as it is for the more price sensitive ordinary customers that can indeed adapt 
to the changes in the weekly cycle by filling gasoline during the weekend (see 
discussion on price discrimination below).  
3.2. Econometric analysis 
In this section, we introduce some simple econometric models. We use the NWB data 
set. Since we have an unbalanced panel with a significant number of consecutive 
observations for only some stations, we choose not to impose an autoregressive 
process. To account for potential local market effects and heterogeneity across 
stations we estimate a fixed effect model where we include a full set of station 
dummies ( i ). In addition, we include seven brand dummies (Brand).8 We estimate 
the following model: 
(1) 
tiib bibd tdd
tTrendtRotterdamtTAXti
BrandAltDay
TrendRotterdamTAXP
,
7
1 ,
6
1 ,
,




   
Tax enters through a continuous variable as total tax in NOK (TAX), and we also 
allow for a linear trend (Trend). Furthermore, we control for changes in the wholesale 
price of gasoline (Rotterdam). We estimate the model for the period ‘prior to Easter 
2004’ (07.03.2003–26.04.2004), and for the period ‘after Easter 2004’ (27.04.2004–
08.04.2005). The ‘after Easter’ model is also estimated where we exclude the six 
                                                 
8 We have eight brands (number of observations in parentheses): four majors; Esso (8,382), Hydro- 
Texaco (3,167), Shell (3,791) and Statoil (6,831), and four automat companies; JET (1,973), UnoX 
(830), SMART (1,584) and REMA (265). We assign dummies to the first seven. 
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weeks where the pattern changed back (06.09.04-17.10.04), see the discussion around 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 above. The weekly retail price cycle is controlled for using six 
weekdays dummies (indicating noon to noon periods), with Monday and Thursday as 
the reference days.  
The results are presented in Table 2.9 Both the tax and the wholesale variables are 
significant and positive for both periods.10 The results suggest a weak negative trend, 
though it turns positive when we exclude the six weeks of fall in 2004.11 The brand 
dummies are significant in five to six out of seven cases. The lower-priced automated 
stations, as expected, have negative parameters, which are significant in five out of six 
cases across models. The explanatory power is reasonably high, even though we were 
unable to incorporate an autoregressive process into the model. 12  Note that we 
increase the explanation power from 0.37 to 0.49 and to the same same level as for the 
model for the period prior to April 2004 (0.50) when we exclude the noise from the 
six fall weeks of 2004.  
Turning to the weekly cycles, we find results that are in accordance with the average 
prices reported in Figure 3. Prior to April 2004, Thursday is the high-price day. The 
price on Thursday is significantly higher than on all other days. When looking at the 
weekly pattern after April 2004, the reference day (Monday) is the high-price day, 
                                                 
9 Fixed effect dummies (116) are not reported here, but are available on request to the authors. 
10 There are some differences in magnitude on these parameters across models. We have re-estimated 
the models, imposing the ‘Prior’ parameter estimates for Tax and Rotterdam price in the ‘After’ 
models, and the ‘After’ parameter estimates in the ‘Prior’ models. The results remains the same, in 
particular the price pattern parameters are very similar to those in Table 2. 
11 All three models have been estimated removing the trend, and the results are much the same. 
12 We have estimated the models also applying the generalized least squares method of Prais-Winsten, 
allowing an AR(1) process in the error term. The results are robust to this estimation technique. The 
price pattern we find using OLS is confirmed also in these models.    
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with all weekday dummies being significant and negative, and generally increasing in 
magnitude (negative) until Sunday. As we saw in Figure 3, when we exclude the six 
weeks when the pattern returned in the fall of 2004 (column 3), the Thursday jump 
disappears and the weekly price difference increases.  The predicted difference 
between Sunday and Monday varies between NOK 0.43 and 0.60.13 14  
A potential worry might be that the results are driven by the aggregation across more 
than a hundred gasoline stations with varying degrees of observations over time and 
days of the week (highly unbalanced panel). For instance one might think that price 
reporting systematically differed according to day of the week and rural and central 
areas, thereby imposing patterns due to the reporting routines. Atkinson (2008) 
compares a panel of systematically collected station prices and internet based prices. 
He finds that a station’s price is not more likely to be reported if it is higher or lower 
than the daily citywide mean or mode price. To elaborate on this issue in our NWB 
dataset, we have looked at the distribution of observations across ten regions, where 
regions differ between remote rural areas, intermediate rural areas and different cities. 
There are, however, no systematic differences across regions regarding on which days 
prices are reported. To check for the importance of potential systematic effects from 
missing observations over time across stations we have estimated all three models in 
Table 2 where we include only the 10 (20) stations where we have the longest time 
series (‘top 10’ and ‘top 20’). 
                                                 
13 A corresponding econometric analysis of the LTS data has been undertaken. This shows a clear 
pattern of Monday as the high-price day, mirroring the results found for the NWB dataset after April 
2004 (Foros and Steen, 2008). 
14 In Table 2 we use ordinary least squares standard errors. One could argue that it would be more 
appropriate to use clustered standard errors. To check for robustness we have estimated the models 
both using clustering (station*day-of-week), and only station. The standard errors do increase 
somewhat, but all main conclusions are robust. 
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Table 2 Empirical results for gasoline price models using web-based panel data where 
days are defined from noon to noon (n = 26,823) 
 Prior to 04:2004 After 04:2004 After 04:2004 
(excluded 06:09:04-
17:10:04 
tax 1.640*** 0.993*** 0.478*** 
 (0.168) (0.111) (0.103) 
rotterdam 1.389*** 0.887*** 0.982*** 
 (0.025) (0.019) (0.019) 
alttrend -0.0009*** -0.0001* 0.0001* 
 (4.86E-05) (0.00007) (0.00006) 
Monday -0.340***   
 (0.012)   
Tuesday -0.163*** -0.055*** -0.105*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) 
Wednesday -0.098*** -0.194*** -0.268*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Thursday  -0.149*** -0.346*** 
  (0.014) (0.013) 
Friday -0.222*** -0.283*** -0.460*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
Saturday -0.326*** -0.367*** -0.552*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Sunday -0.288*** -0.423*** -0.598*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
Esso -0.047 0.346* 0.229 
 (0.079) (0.202) (0.183) 
Hydro-Texaco -0.195** -0.107 -0.335*** 
 (0.093) (0.090) (0.107) 
JET  -0.002 -0.377*** -0.553*** 
 (0.059) (0.080) (0.086) 
Shell 0.305*** 0.340*** 0.191* 
 (0.072) (0.105) (0.102) 
Smart -0.379*** -0.216** -0.269*** 
 (0.072) (0.094) (0.095) 
Statoil -0.132* 0.209** 0.053 
 (0.080) (0.104) (0.230) 
UnoX -0.426*** -0.304*** -0.253** 
 (0.062) (0.110) (0.120) 
R2 0.502 0.372 0.495 
N 14746 12077 10026 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level 
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The price pattern and main findings are confirmed also within these models.15 
3.3 Margin development  
An interesting question is whether the shift in price pattern has affected the gross 
margin. In Table 3, we present summary statistics on some of the key variables.  
Table 3 Summary statistics: gross margin, tax, wholesale price and retail gasoline 
price from web-based panel data (n = 26,823) 
|     n Mean    Stnd.Dev.  Min. Max. 
The 100 days before Easter 2004* 
Retail price 3897 9.145 0.554 7.550 10.220 
Wholesale price 3897 1.795 0.132 1.587 2.129 
Tax 3897 4.720 0.000 4.720 4.720 
VAT 3897 1.829 0.111 1.510 2.044 
Gross margin 3897 0.801 0.422 –0.525 1.608 
The 100 days after Easter 2004** 
Retail price 2920 9.732 0.501 7.210 13.230 
Wholesale price 2920 2.156 0.162 1.861 2.441 
Tax 2920 4.720 0.000 4.720 4.720 
VAT 2920 1.946 0.100 1.442 2.646 
Gross margin 2920 0.909 0.410 –0.968 3.554 
* Period: 07:03:2003–27:04:2004. ** Period: 28:04:2004–08:04:2005. 
Over a period of six months within the same year, it is unlikely that the cost 
components covered by the gross margin should change significantly. The retail price 
increases from NOK 9.14 to 9.73 over these two periods (6.4%). However, whereas 
the tax did not change during these two hundred days, the wholesale price did, 
increasing from NOK 1.80 to NOK 2.16. If we account for the VAT, this amounts to 
most of the price increase. Still, when we look at the gross margin it has increased 
over these two periods by as much as NOK 0.11, or 13.5%, on average. Considering 
only averages does not allow us to control for changes in costs and the weekly price 
pattern. In Foros and Steen (2008), we use the web-based panel data set (NWB) to 
                                                 
15 For the ‘top 10’ stations, we have between 385 and 750 price observations per station, representing 
5532 observations in total (27.6% of total sample). The ‘top 20’ stations constitute between 342 and 
750 station specific price observations, and represents a total of 9161 observations (34.2% of the total 
sample). The results are available on request to the authors. 
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specify a simple econometric gross margin model. We find a significant and higher 
increase in the average margin when econometrically controlling for week pattern, 
costs and trend. The results suggest that the average gross margin went up by more 
than 20% after April 2004.16 
4. Price determination17 
At the retail level the big four companies have a combination of fully vertically 
integrated retail outlets and vertically separated retail outlets. This dual distribution 
system corresponds to what is observed in several other countries, and Shepard (1993) 
and Slade (1998), among others, analyze the rationales behind the choice of market 
structure from the upstream headquarters’ perspective.    
Under vertical separation retailers have exclusive long-term contracts (usually for five 
years or more) with one of the major oil companies, and the pump price is (formally) 
set by the retailer. We thus have a market structure with multiple upstream-
downstream pairs, and within an upstream-downstream pair the downstream firm uses 
the upstream firm’s brand. We now scrutinize on the vertical restraints imposed on 
vertically separated retail outlets to show how the (upstream) headquarters transfer the 
control over pump prices from the retailers at least for part of the week.   
                                                 
16 Clearly, the average margin understates the true change in retail margins since customers will take 
time to adapt to the new price cycle. Furthermore, one might think that the imposed price support 
system reduces price dispersion across nearby stations. If this is the case, there is less room for 
customers to shop around for lower prices and thereby retail margins might have been improved.  
17 This section is based on interviews with 35 retail outlet managers and on press articles. In particular, 
we also have copies of faxes and communication information between headquarters and retailers 
provided anonymously by some of the retailer managers. 31 of these interviews were undertaken by 
Irene Kvernenes and Åse Tiller Vangsnes as a part of their master thesis. 
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Let c be the channel’s input price per liter of gasoline (the major components of c in 
Europe are the Rotterdam price and tax). The margin for the total channel is thus p-c, 
where p is the pump price.  The upstream firm uses a sophisticated profit-sharing 
scheme towards the downstream firm.   
The first part of the scheme specifies a maximum RPM, which is de facto the 
recommended price (prp) exclusive of transportation costs. As long as the pump price 
equals the recommended price (the price ceiling), the retailer is charged a wholesale 
price wrp, where wrp is significantly higher than c. If we abstract from the 
transportation cost element, the retailer then achieves the margin Mrp=prp - wrp as long 
as the pump price equals the maximum RPM.  This part of the profit sharing scheme 
is permanently available throughout the week.  
Three out of the four major firms (Statoil, Shell and YX) make the recommended 
price publicly available on their website.18 Until 2005 Shell’s recommended price was 
published on the Norwegian Petroleum Industry Association’s website. 19  This 
information was removed after pressure from the competition authorities, but the 
companies are still permitted to post the information on their individual websites.20 
The second part of the profit–sharing scheme is labeled price support.  This scheme 
specifies a margin Mps which is given to the retailer if the retailer reduces the pump 
                                                 
18 Thanks to information provided by anonymous retailers we know that Esso operates a price support 
scheme system that resembles the system used by Statoil, Shell and YX.  
19 Between 1975 and 2005 the Norwegian Petroleum Industry Association made Shell’s recommended 
price publicly available for the other major oil companies. Changes in Shell’s recommended price were 
always made at 12 noon, and the Norwegian Petroleum Industry Association announced the new price 
the following morning. Source: the Norwegian Petroleum Industry Association.  
20 Recommended prices are observed used in several countries; e.g. Australia, (ACCC, 2007), Ireland 
(The Irish Competition Authority, 2003), The Netherlands, Germany and Italy (Faber and Janssen, 
2008). 
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price below the maximum RPM (prp), where Mps< Mrp. A crucial feature of this price 
support component is that it is not permanently available.  The upstream firm may 
choose to withdraw the price support scheme for a period of time. When the price 
support is withdrawn, the retailer will have the margin p-wrp. All the four major 
companies have seemingly set wrp such that they induce the retailer to set p= prp in 
periods where the price support is not available (the maximum RPM is binding).   
The conditional price support system described above corresponds to the one used by 
one firm in Australia, as described by Wang (2009). Wang shows that when price 
support is withdrawn, the system forces the retailer to set the pump price in the 
interval  prp- wrp. Analogous to our findings, Wang accentuates that the interval   prp- 
wrp is set such that the retailers are induced to set the pump price at the level 
suggested by the headquarters, and consequently leading to the synchronization of the 
retail prices from the company’s retailers.   
The main ingredients in the profit-sharing scheme described here correspond to what 
is found in other gasoline markets by The Irish Competition Authority (2003) in 
Ireland and by ACCC (2007) and Wang (2009) in Australia.21 However, the profit-
sharing arrangements used in Norway have some distinctive features. These features 
may explain why the Norwegian price cycles appear distinctive. Compared to 
Australia and Ireland there seems to be an industry-wide adoption of a very similar 
system for all the four major companies in Norway.   
                                                 
21 On some aspects The Irish Competition Authority (2003) and ACCC (2007) provide more detailed 
information about the price support schemes. ACCC (2007) finds that the margin offered under the 
price support scheme is increasing in the retail price. In this case, the profit sharing scheme may be 
described as price-dependent, where M(p) and M’(p)>0. This may obviously reduce retailers’ 
undercutting incentives.   
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Price support schemes (also labeled temporary allowances) are used in several 
countries during price war periods (see Slade, 1998, for descriptions of the schemes 
used in the Canadian market). The retailer then receives price support when the retail 
price is below a certain level. In contrast, the Norwegian arrangements appear 
distinctive in the way that price support is granted and withdrawn on a regular basis 
on given days of the week. Monday has emerged as a focal point for when the 
upstream firms (the big four) withdraw the price support. On Monday morning all the 
big four upstream firms inform their retailers through a fax that the price support 
scheme will be removed from around noon until five pm (the interval varies slightly 
between the companies).   
This will de facto force the retailers to increase their prices to the recommended price 
(prp), and the retailers will in any case not reduce the price below this level before the 
price support system comes into effect again on Monday evening. This is illustrated in 
Figure 7. Suppose that a retailer’s pump price on Monday morning is p*=p< wrp. As 
long as the price support scheme is in force, the retailer’s margin is Mps. When the 
upstream firm withdraws the price support, the retailer will have a negative margin p- 
wrp if (s)he does not raise the price.22 As argued above, the level of wrp is set so as to 
induce all the retailers to raise the price to prp (plus transportation costs). We thus 
have an industry-wide vertical restraint, which instructs a given price at around noon 
on Mondays, and the restraint may be regarded as an RPM (at least in the periods 
where the price support scheme is withdrawn). 
                                                 
22  The cycle amplitude differs according to differences in local competition, but it is always 
significantly larger than the individual retailer’s margin, where Mrp is typically 10-20% higher than 
Mps.   
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 Figure 7 An illustration of the price support arrangements 
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The industry-wide adoption of noon on Mondays as a focal point for when to 
withdraw the price support scheme has led to the outcome that all the retail outlets 
increase pump prices to the recommended prices. Pump prices on Mondays are thus 
set by the four headquarters rather than by a large number of independent retailers. 
Upstream firms have managed to establish a predictable pattern, but we should 
accentuate the fact that this pattern could have been established by explicit 
communication, by implicit collusion or by one of the firms taking the lead.  
Usually gasoline pump prices are assumed to be set sequentially both in the increasing 
phase and in the decreasing phase (see discussion by e.g. Wang, 2009). We have 
revealed several features that indicate that the big four companies increase prices 
simultaneously (without knowing the rivals’ prices) on Mondays. As described above, 
the headquarters send faxes to their retailers in order to instruct them to raise pump 
prices around noon on Mondays. These faxes are sent from the headquarters well 
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before the prices actually jump around noon. The faxes are typically sent (from the 
headquarters) during the night between Sunday and Monday, specifying which prices 
are to be set at noon the next day, a practice that can hardly be reconciled with 
sequential behavior. Thus, in reality, all the 1800 retail outlets in Norway 
simultaneously raise their prices to recommended prices on Mondays.   
Let us now turn to the price determination process in the part of the week where the 
price support scheme is in force. Independent retail outlets are obligated to collect 
price information from a given number of rivals (classified as marker stations). The 
information is reported to the upstream headquarters.  The interviews with station 
managers reveal variations with respect to retail outlets’ control of the end-user prices.    
First, towards a number of independent retailers (franchisees) the headquarters have 
imposed a pure RPM also when the price support scheme is in force. Collected price 
information from the marker stations is reported to the headquarters. Based on this 
information the pump prices are set directly by the headquarters.23 
Second, towards another group of retailers the upstream headquarters give a 
“suggested” new price, where the price support scheme (Mps) is provided on condition 
that the retailer follows the suggested price. When such contracts are in force, the 
upstream headquarters in reality determine the pump price reductions (RPM) 
throughout the week (also when the price support schemes are in force).24   
                                                 
23 For some stations this system is implemented such that they receive a “suggested price” from the 
headquarters, but they have no other available options than to press the  “accept”-key.  
24  A similar arrangement was stopped by the Irish competition authorities in 2003 (The Irish 
Competition Authority, 2003). 
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Third, towards some retailers the price support scheme includes a price floor. The 
retailers then decide pump prices until the price floor is reached, and needs to ask the 
(upstream) headquarters for permission to reduce the price further. If they reduce the 
price below the price floor without permission, the price support scheme is 
withdrawn.  
Finally, we have a group of  retail outlets that are classified as being outside price war 
zones. These outlets are not part of the price support scheme at all, and they therefore 
charge the recommended price throughout the week. This is also confirmed by the 
NCA’s  2010 findings.  
Regardless of whether the pump price is set by the headquarters or the retailers, pump 
prices during the decreasing phase are set sequentially and may vary significantly 
from site to site.  
Agency theory has been applied to answer how firms choose between different forms 
of ownership structure in gasoline retailing. Shepard (1993) finds empirical support in 
the US-market that upstream headquarters are choosing contracts with strong 
incentives and less direct control when retail outlets’ unobservable effort is 
important.25  A common problem for the upstream headquarters is that RPM is not 
allowed towards vertically separated outlets. However, the combination of the 
maximum RPM and the profit sharing arrangement (the price support system) 
seemingly provides a perfect substitute for setting the retail pump price directly.26  
                                                 
25 Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1994) find similar results for the Norwegian gasoline market. 
26 From the strategic delegation literature, we know that vertical separation may also be used to soften 
retail competition (Bonanno and Vickers, 1988, Shaffer, 1991, and Rey and Stiglitz, 1995, among 
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5. Alternative explanations 
In this section we discuss alternative explanations for the jump in prices on Mondays 
described in the previous sections.  
5.1. The Edgeworth cycle theory 
A critical assumption in Maskin and Tirole (1988) is that firms set prices sequentially 
in both the increasing phase and the decreasing phase. In the war of attrition phase, 
Maskin and Tirole assume that firms play a mixed strategy game. However, firms 
have incentives to end the war of attrition game as soon as possible, and a firm may 
take the role as the price leader (Wang, 2009). A main contribution of the present 
paper is to show how the headquarters in Norway have managed to establish an 
arrangement where they simultaneously decide to increase pump prices to a given 
level (the recommended price). Consequently, the firms have established an industry-
wide practice that ends the war of attrition phase on Mondays.  
In the decreasing phase prices are set sequentially, and this part of the cycle seems to 
be consistent with the Maskin and Tirole approach. As described above, the price 
support system moves price control from the hands of the retailers to the hands of 
gasoline headquarters. Instead of hundreds of price setters, there are four big 
companies (and a few small companies) that decide pump prices. While it may be 
difficult to see how hundreds of independent retailers set prices according to the 
Edgeworth cycle theory, the Edgeworth cycle explanation becomes more appealing 
when four quite symmetric players decide pump prices.  
                                                                                                                                            
others). Slade (1998) finds empirical support for this rationale using data from the Canadian retail 
gasoline market. 
 
SNF Working Paper No 07/2011
  
27
5.2. Demand fluctuations 
Still maintaining low weekend prices, in April 2004 Monday changed from being the 
low-price day to becoming the high-price day. It is very unlikely that the weekly 
demand pattern changed as abruptly as the price pattern after Easter 2004 would 
suggest. In general, it is also unlikely that we have a large increase sudden in demand 
on one day of the week followed by six days with small reductions in demand (see 
also discussion in Noel (2007a). This is, indeed, not the case in Norway either, which 
is confirmed by the volume figures from the Nowegian Competition Authority (2010); 
see Figure 6 in Section 3 above. 
5.3. Input price variation 
In Figure 1, we showed the average weekly pattern in retail price and taxes plus the 
Rotterdam spot price. We do not  observe a weekly pattern in the cost components. 
Analogous to Noel (2007a), we dismiss the explanation that gasoline inventories at 
the retail stations influence retail prices. 
5.4. Price discrimination 
Intertemporal price discrimination has also been suggested as an alternative 
explanation for price patterns that appear as Edgeworth cycles (see discussion by 
Eckert and West, 2004).27 In contrast to the Maskin and Tirole model, the firms’ 
                                                 
27 Conlisk et al. (1984) consider a monopoly provider of durable goods that uses periodic reductions in 
price to discriminate between low- and high-value consumers. Sobel (1984) extends Conlisk et al. 
(1984) to the case of competition. In Conlisk et al. (1984) and Sobel (1984), new consumers enter the 
market in each period, but consumers who do not buy, remain in the market, and the residual demand 
builds up until price cuts become profitable. Dutta et al. (2007) combine elements from repeated game 
and durable goods models where the residual demand is bounded by the ‘death’ of consumers. 
However, residual demand may be large enough to ensure temporary price cuts in equilibrium. 
Roughly speaking, Dutta et al. (2007) show that the existence of an equilibrium with temporary price 
cuts depends on the fact that firms are more patient than consumers. The result is qualitatively in line 
with Sobel (1984), and may be viewed as a form of intertemporal price discrimination. Note that 
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incentive to gradually reduce the price in price discrimination models comes from the 
existence of heterogeneous consumers; e.g. different degrees of patience. The practice 
by which price cycles restart on Mondays ensures a period with relatively high prices 
in the first part of the week and a period of lower prices towards the end of the week.  
This may imply a price structure that largely introduces intertemporal price 
discrimination between consumers that differ in their willingness or ability to wait.   
Even if price discrimination is not the driving force behind the cycle, price 
discrimination may explain why the firms coordinate, with Monday as the high price 
day. The Norwegian Competition Authority (see Figure 6 above) shows how 
customers have adapted to the weekly price pattern. From 2005 to 2008 we observe 
that in periods volumes on Sunday and Mondays have increased by around 50% from 
approximately 3% to 4-5% of weekly consumption, and total Sunday consumption 
has increased by as much as 20%. However, we do not observe a similar reduction in 
demand during the day on weekdays where a large portion of the consumers is 
business customers less prepared or able to adapt their purchasing pattern to the price 
cycle.  
In terms of gasoline, the cost of inventorying relates to how much people drive. The 
Norwegian price pattern clearly suggests a fixed seven-day cycle. People who use less 
than a tank of gasoline per week (the average driver in Norway) may therefore wait 
until the price falls, but people with a higher usage cannot. When prices increase on 
Mondays, retail prices are at their lowest level during the weekends, when less price 
sensitive business customers are not present in the market.  
                                                                                                                                            
consumers expect a price increase in the next period, and temporary price cuts in equilibrium are thus 
different from equilibrium price wars. 
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Analogous to the findings from Canada by Eckert and West (2004), the NCA (2010) 
reveals that in some regions with high concentration, we do not observe cycles. The 
prices are then always equal to the recommended prices (plus transportation costs). 
This observation speaks against the price discrimination explanation. 
5.5. Collusive behavior 
It is implausible that the change in the price pattern in 2004, coinciding with an 
increase in markup, was a pure coincidence.  The pattern may have been established 
by explicit communication, implicit collusion or by one of the big four oil companies 
behaving as a leader. From our interviews with the managers and other available 
information we have not been able to find a clear answer to this. 
Since it was first established, the information exchange arrangement described in 
Section 4 has proved to be robust, and it helps players both at the upstream and 
downstream level to detect deviations from the rule of increasing prices to 
recommended prices on Mondays. The arrangement also allows retail prices to adjust 
for changes in demand or cost conditions without triggering deviations from the rule.  
6. Summary and conclusions 
By using daily station-specific observations of gasoline pump prices from a large 
number of Norwegian stations from March 2003 to March 2006 we find price cycles 
that last exactly a week. Retail outlets increase their pump prices to the recommended 
price posted by the major oil companies’ headquarters around noon on Mondays. We 
describe how the headquarters have managed to establish an industry-wide pattern 
where all retail outlets raise their pump prices around noon every Monday according 
to the recommended prices set by the headquarters.  Furthermore, we describe how 
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the big four gasoline companies use vertical restraints to transfer price control from 
the hands of independent retailers into the hands of the headquarters.  
An interesting issue is obviously the impact for competition policy. Communication 
about prices, which provides commitment value and more information to consumers 
about retail price differences, may very well be welfare enhancing (Motta, 2004, and 
Kühn, 2001). In the current context, however, it is difficult to see the efficiency 
effects of the ‘public’ announcement of recommended prices. The recommended 
prices appear to be made public primarily to increase transparency among competitors 
and facilitate potential horizontal coordination. As argued by Motta (2004) and Kühn 
(2001), communication directed only at rivals should be banned.    
As a response to the first version of the present paper (Foros and Steen, 2008) the 
Norwegian Competition Authority initiated an inquiry into the Norwegian gasoline 
market during spring 2008 (reported in NCA 2010). The inquiry confirms our findings 
that retail pump prices for almost all retail outlets in Norway are adjusted to the 
recommended prices on Mondays. Not surprisingly, the competition authorities did 
not find hard evidence for overt collusion between the major oil companies, but 
proposes that intertemporal price discrimination may be the main motivation behind 
the arrangement. In their inquiry, the Norwegian Competition Authority did not make 
any comment on the price support system scrutinized in the present system.  
In Ireland the competition authorities  stopped a practice used by Statoil (The Irish 
Competition Authority, 2003), and in Denmark the authorities recently forced the 
headquarters not to use price support arrangements that limit the independent 
retailers’ control of price decisions (The Danish Competition Authority, 2009). Given 
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that the Norwegian competition authorities have decided to use significant resources 
on investigating the retail gasoline market, what begs a question is why they use their 
effort to present alternative explanations for why the established practice may benefit 
consumers. They could simply have asked the oil companies to prove that the vertical 
restraints used and the publication of recommended prices benefit consumers.  
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Appendix A – Data description 
The first data set is a website-based panel data set (NWB). This is compiled using a 
large number of nationwide Norwegian stations covering the period from March 7, 
2003 to April 4, 2005, where consumers reported prices via text messages or emails. 
The original data set had approximately 40,000 observations, but we reduced this to 
include only gas stations with at least 100 observations. The final sample comprised 
26,823 observations in total. We have information on price, station, address, date and 
exact time of day. The NWB data are quite representative in terms of the main market 
brands. For instance, the four largest gasoline companies represent 83% of the 
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observations; over the same period, their market share was close to 95%. The big four 
have the following market shares in the NWB data: Esso 31.3%, Hydro-Texaco (now 
YX) 11.8%, Shell 14.1% and Statoil 25.5%. Their corresponding average market 
shares were 21.7%, 20.8%, 25.8% and 26.9% in 2004.28  Thus, the share of automated 
stations in our sample is larger than their market share in the actual market, suggesting 
a downward bias in the average prices we observe. The distribution of observations 
across hours suggests a morning and afternoon hump, where approximately two thirds 
of the observations are reported between 06:00 and 12:00. Our ‘noon-to-noon’ days 
capture both humps every day. Only 2% of prices are reported during the night 
(00:00-06:00). 
The other data set consists of collected time series of daily prices at a smaller number 
of local stations (LTS) for two periods of four to five months during 2005 and 2006, 
with 1,067 observations from seven stations, varying between 50 and 312 daily prices. 
The prices were collected in the afternoon. The stations are as follows. 
 
Table A1 The LTS dataset gasoline stations 
Name Brand Data periods Address 
NHH Statoil 04.01.05–03.07.05, 
17.10.05–15.03.06 
Hellev. 34, 5042 Bergen 
Askøy Statoil 04.01.05–23.05.05 Ravnanger, 5310 Hauglandshella 
Nesttun Statoil 17.10.05–15.03.06 Nesttunv. 91, 5221 Nesttun 
Nadderud* Statoil 25.02.06–15.03.06 Nadderudveien 55, 1357 Bekkestua 
Nesttun Shell 17.10.05–15.03.06 Nesttunv. 87, 5221 Nesttun 
Askøy Hydro-Texaco 04.01.05–23.05.05 Davanger, 5310 Hauglandshella 
Tertnes Hydro-Texaco 04.01.05–23.05.05 Botnane 1, 5119 Ulset 
* Nadderud, a Statoil station in Oslo, is not local in the sense that it is not located in the Bergen area. 
In addition, we used recommended prices from Statoil collected from their web page. 
To calculate input prices, we used Rotterdam prices ‘Conventional Regular Gasoline, 
                                                 
28 Source: The Norwegian Petroleum Industry Association. 
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Rotterdam (ARA)’ and translated these into NOK using the daily exchange rate 
between USD and NOK. The environment tax on gasoline is constructed using figures 
from The Norwegian Petroleum Industry Association. Summary statistics for the two 
datasets are tabulated below.  
Table A2 Summary statistics for retail and wholesale prices, tax and gross margins  
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
2003 (NWB data)      
Price 10231 8.74 0.56 5.90 12.00 
Rotterdam 10231 1.51 0.14 1.25 1.89 
Tax 10231 4.64 0.00 4.64 4.64 
VAT 10231 1.75 0.11 1.18 2.40 
Gross Margin 10231 0.84 0.42 –1.36 3.46 
2004 (NWB data)      
Price 13693 9.45 0.61 6.63 13.23 
Rotterdam 13693 1.99 0.25 1.45 2.44 
Tax 13693 4.72 0.00 4.72 4.72 
VAT 13693 1.89 0.12 1.33 2.65 
Gross Margin 13693 0.85 0.42 –1.63 3.55 
2005 (NWB data)      
Price 2899 9.70 0.58 7.89 11.24 
Rotterdam 2899 2.00 0.21 1.55 2.60 
Tax 2899 4.85 0.01 4.81 4.85 
VAT 2899 1.94 0.12 1.58 2.25 
Gross Margin 2899 0.91 0.43 –0.49 1.82 
2005/2006 (LTS data)      
Price 1067 10.49 0.53 8.95 11.57 
Rotterdam 1062 2.43 0.29 1.86 2.99 
Tax 1067 4.84 0.03 4.81 4.89 
VAT 1067 2.10 0.11 1.79 2.31 
Gross Margin 1062 1.12 0.33 0.66 1.70 
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